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Abstract
Throughout history the world has been plagued by insurgencies. While
the underlying causes of each new insurgency have been different, they
are all similar in certain areas. This similarity entails that the effective
countering of an insurgency can be turned into a science with a set of
guidelines to follow based on conditions on the ground. Guidelines are
important because insurgencies are flexible and to defeat them the
counterinsurgency must be equally flexible if not more flexible. Good
intelligence is critical to the success of an insurgency. With their small,
poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when
to strike and when to pull back. This reliance on intelligence means that
an effective counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence so
that the counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike,
where they are based, how they are supplied, where they keep their
weapons, and other essential pieces of information.
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throughout history the world has been plagued by insurgencies. While 
the underlying causes of each new insurgency have been different, they 
are all similar in certain areas. this similarity entails that the  effective 
countering of an insurgency can be turned into a science with a set of 
guidelines to follow based on conditions on the ground. guidelines are 
important because insurgencies are flexible and to defeat them the 
counterinsurgency must be equally flexible if not more flexible. good 
intelligence is critical to the success of an insurgency. With their small, 
poorly equipped forces, the leaders of insurgencies need to know when 
to strike and when to pull back. this reliance on intelligence means that 
an effective counterinsurgency must also rely on good intelligence so that 
the counterinsurgents may know where the insurgency will strike, where 
they are based, how they are supplied, where they keep their weapons, 
and other essential pieces of information.
the united States has run effective insurgencies against the British in 
the american colonies during the revolutionary War, the Japanese in 
the Philippines during World War ii, and provided critical aid to the 
afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets during the Soviet–afghan War. 
With these prior triumphs the united States should be better prepared to 
counter insurgencies. However, having failed in Vietnam, Somalia, and 
lebanon, their successes on the side of the insurgent have not  translated 
into success on the other side. the verdict is still out on the current 
 counterinsurgencies in afghanistan and iraq but victory can be achieved 
in both situations.
in order to discover what actions need to be taken to wage an effective 
counterinsurgency and why intelligence is critical to the process, it is 
important to look at the past successes and failures of both insurgencies 
and counterinsurgencies. it is also important to note what has changed 
in modern insurgencies and what has stayed the same in order to 
 ensure that effective strategies from the past will still be effective today. 
 lessons learned from the american revolution, Boer Wars, filipino 
 insurgency during World War ii, Vietnam War, Soviet–afghan War, and 
the  lebanese civil War can help us understand the challenges facing us 
today in iraq and afghanistan. from these case studies, a broader picture 
can be drawn regarding the intelligence successes and failures of each 
war. from here, a better plan can be developed that will be effective in 
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 eliminating the problems of the past and thus support for the insurgency 
can be reduced until it is no longer a viable force.
The American Revolution: 1775–1783
the success of the american revolution is due, in large part, to the 
 successful intelligence operations conducted by george Washington. 
During the french and indian Wars, Washington had learned that  
“there is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate 
a designing enemy, & nothing that required greater pains to obtain.”1 
in  December 1776, the future of the revolution was looking grim. 
 Washington’s army had been continually pummeled by British  regulars 
and Hessian  mercenaries at long island, White Plains, and fort 
 Washington. the colonial army had managed to retreat across new 
Jersey and cross the Delaware river and the British decided to wait until 
warmer weather to put an end to the rebellion. Both sides thought the 
end was near until a man named John Honeyman was seized near the 
camp and brought before Washington as a suspected spy. Honeyman had 
fought beside Washington during the french and indian Wars and was 
currently one of Washington’s spies. Honeyman told Washington that the 
British and Hessians were off guard and distracted because christmas 
was approaching. Washington locked him in the guardhouse overnight 
to preserve his cover and then engineered his escape the same night 
by causing a fire. Honeyman reported back to the British commander, 
 colonel rall, about his escape and that the americans were completely 
incapable of mounting an offensive. this confirmed rall’s own thoughts 
so he ignored the talk from his other agents saying that the americans 
were about to attack. the americans attacked during a blizzard and 
took trenton. only four of their men were wounded.2 the american 
 revolution was saved due to the effective use of intelligence.
During his stay at Valley forge the following winter Washington wrote 
letters mentioning fictitious infantry and cavalry regiments which he 
passed on to his double agents. the letters made it to the British and 
caused them to believe that Washington had over eight thousand more 
troops than he actually had. they concluded that he was too strong to 
attack at that time.3 Just as it had the previous winter, intelligence once 
again saved the american revolution.
in the summer of 1780 the french landed at newport, rhode island.  
the culper Spy ring warned Washington that clinton, whose army was 
in new york, planned to attack the french. Washington slipped reports 
to British spies claiming that he was planning an offensive against  
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new york. clinton called off the attack on the french forces after 
 learning of Washington’s plans.4 instead of conducting an attack against 
an  unprepared french force, clinton’s army sat in new york and waited  
for Washington’s attack which never came. Had clinton attacked the 
french at newport it is likely that he would have been victorious.
in the summer of 1781, clinton received american dispatches about a 
combined attack from Washington’s army and the french forces against 
new york. this had in fact been the original plan but  Washington 
changed his mind and decided to head south and attack cornwallis  
instead. to trick clinton he prepared letters stating that his original  
plan still stood and both his forces and the french forces would be  
attacking new york. He also set up a camp at chatham, new Jersey  
and set boats on the shore leading the British to suspect an invasion  
of Staten island.5 as the french and american forces moved south,  
clinton’s army stayed in new york and prepared for an attack that  
would never come.
george Washington’s use of intelligence during the american  revolution 
paved the way for the american victory. When they used intelligence 
the americans were able to fight when they knew they could win and 
 convince the British not to attack when they knew they would lose. 
When the future of the revolution looked bleakest it was the use of good 
 intelligence that brought them through it. Had colonel rall listened 
to his other intelligence reports and prepared his defenses, then the 
 american revolution may have been crushed at trenton in 1776. Had  
the British sent scouts to Valley forge and discovered the true strength 
and condition of Washington’s forces, the revolution may have ended 
there in 1777. Had clinton verified the reports sent to him concerning 
Washington’s impending attack in the summer of 1780 he may have 
discovered it to be a ruse and defeated the french forces in newport. 
Had clinton learned from that previous deception and monitored the 
movement of Washington’s forces and the french forces in the summer 
of 1781 then he may have been able to provide support to cornwallis in 
yorktown.
the insurgency and counterinsurgency of the american  revolution 
was significantly different than those of today. the encounters  between 
the two forces were still set-piece battles. Despite that  difference, this 
case study still shows that the effective use of intelligence by one 
side led to significant advantages. the clarity of the advantages 
that  intelligence  produced in the american revolution provides the 
 groundwork from which effective strategies to defeat insurgencies and 
the use of  intelligence in those strategies can be built.
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The Boer Wars: 1880–1881 and 1899–1902
the Boer Wars offer an interesting case when looking at the use of 
 intelligence in effective counterinsurgency strategies because the two 
wars are close together chronologically and the wars had a different 
 outcome. the British were resoundingly defeated during the first Boer 
War while the Boers were defeated despite high British casualties during 
the Second Boer War. these results allow a look at the different tactics 
used that allowed the British to succeed during the Second Boer War  
and caused them to fail during the first.
the first Boer War was a few months long and saw three major battles. 
the first battle at laing’s nek was an attempted incursion into the Boer’s 
territory in transvaal. the British, led by general colley were crushed 
at laing’s nek and retreated to Schuinshoogte hill. the Boer’s attacked 
the hill causing the British to once again retreat. the British forces used 
 easily recognizable fighting formations, bright red uniforms, and shiny 
white helmets. all of which led to their downfall.6 the Boers were  better 
 marksmen and hid in whatever cover they could find. general colley 
ascended Mount Majuba with most of his troops, approximately 375 
 riflemen. this is where the final battle was to take place. Historians are 
still unsure as to why colley chose to take this mountain but the most 
 accepted idea is that he wanted to make a show of force from what he saw 
as an unassailable position. the Boers attacked with no more than 350 
men. they attacked early in the morning and performed what has been 
called a perfect example of fire and movement which is still  being taught 
to this day. they used the brush and terraces as cover and  advanced 
 behind a knoll. after a lull in the firing, the Boers flanked the British and 
hid beyond the crest of the hill. this position allowed them to shoot the 
 British in the backs at close range. the British began to retreat and many 
were shot as they fled. Some tried to hide but were rounded up by the 
Boers. only one Boer was killed. this crushing defeat for the  British ended 
the first Boer War and pushed the British to negotiate a peace settlement.7
colley made several mistakes both before and during the battle. He was 
overconfident in the abilities of his troops and in the terrain which he 
chose to fight on. His belief that the position was unassailable may have 
been swayed had he conducted proper reconnaissance of all sides of the 
mountain. the knoll that the Boers were able to enter behind was a clear 
weak point and he should have had more troops stationed there. this lack 
of geoint enabled the Boers to exploit the terrain to their  advantage. 
colley also should have conducted watches and patrols around the clock 
so as not to be surprised by a Boer attack. tactical  intelligence on the 
movements of the Boers, especially just prior to the attack, would have 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/3
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.3</p>
77
the importance of intelligence in combating a Modern insurgency
allowed colley to prepare his men accordingly and set up defensive 
formations in positions that would have given them a wide view of the 
slope that the Boers were advancing on. this failure is  reminiscent of the 
german Hessians at trenton during the american revolution where lack 
of intelligence also led to a crushing defeat in a decisive battle.
the Second Boer War was longer and the British learned from some of 
the mistakes they had made during the first Boer War but were slow to 
catch on to other mistakes. one important change that was instituted 
early was that they painted their red uniforms khaki. this adoption of a 
more camouflaged appearance made the field a little less unbalanced.8
the Boers had a high level of individual training and could be likened 
to an army of snipers. they had a high level of confidence in their 
own  abilities and had a great degree of initiative. they did not use any 
 particular maneuvers and instead relied on a sort of swarm technique in 
which they would surround the enemy and each individual Boer would 
close in whenever they saw the opportunity to do so. When defending an 
area from advancing British troops, the Boers would use the terrain to 
their full advantage. they would build trenches at the bases of small hills 
and camouflage them with leaves and branches. this allowed them to fire 
while standing and still be concealed. it also confused the British who 
would fire their artillery at the tops of the hills as they expected the Boers 
to occupy the higher ground. the Boers also developed what is known as 
a strongpoint defense. they created a series of partially roofed  zigzagging 
slit trenches at the bases of hills. they lured the British advance in 
 between their trenches and then opened fire on them from the front and 
from either side. Sometimes the Boers would create dummy trenches at 
the tops of hills, where the British would expect them to be, so that the 
British would fire their artillery at the dummy trenches. the Boers also 
used scouts to track the movement of the British forces so they were able 
to easily evade the British who always traveled in large groups.9
Despite the effective use of both geoint and HuMint by the Boers, 
they were unable to effectively assault the British garrisons due to their 
lack of artillery. general Kitchener, who was in command of the British 
forces from 1900 to the end of the war in 1902, employed three  strategies 
that proved to be decisive in the defeat of the Boers. these were scorched 
earth, civilian internment camps, and blockhouse chains.10 the scorched 
earth policy involved burning farms and slaughtering cattle. the Boers 
were unable to protect the farms from being destroyed and this led to 
large food shortages in the Boer population. the civilians from these 
farms were then put into camps that became overcrowded very quickly. 
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over one-third of the civilians who entered the camps died from either 
disease or malnourishment.11 the blockhouse chains were critical in 
hampering the movements of the Boers. a blockhouse is an isolated 
 one-building fort used against enemies who do not possess artillery.  
By building a chain of these forts the British were able to see across vast 
 distances and protect large areas from Boer attack. even with these 
 effective strategies, the British required a force of 4,50,000 soldiers to 
stop the Boers whose force was never more than 50,000.12
Filipino Insurgency during World War II: 1942–1945
following the defeat of the main u.S. forces at Bataan on april 9, 1942 
some of the u.S. soldiers who had been separated from the main force 
were left with the decision to either surrender or try to escape the islands. 
a few of them chose another route and decided to stay and develop a 
filipino insurgency movement against the Japanese occupiers. one of 
the commanders, who was also one of the only commanders on luzon 
who had not been captured or killed by 1943 was lieutenant ramsey.13 
He traveled all across the Philippines, mostly on the island of luzon, to 
recruit filipinos into the insurgency. they did not usually fight against 
the Japanese patrols and usually just kept tabs on where the Japanese 
were, how many there were, what defenses they were building, and how 
many ships they had. cells were developed in towns and villages and in 
the capital, Manila, that reported, through the use of runners who hand 
delivered messages to ramsey’s headquarters, a highly camouflaged 
camp on the top of a mountain.
to combat these cells the Japanese would conduct raids on villages they 
suspected of housing insurgents and on outposts whenever they found 
them. Sometimes the villages and outposts were given advanced warning 
through the use of scouts and sometimes they were not. the Japanese 
would also do sweeps of the city of Manila when they heard that ramsey 
was there. they never caught him.
in 1944, they stepped up their offensive operations with a plan to place 
small bombs on varying timers all over the city of Manila. they created 
small lead bombs filled with black powder. the timing mechanism was 
sulfuric acid which would slowly eat through a copper plate and light 
matches which would ignite the black powder. the copper plates were of 
varying thickness depending on what time of day they were supposed to 
be placed so that the bombs would go off at roughly the same time. they 
trained saboteurs to place the bombs near fuel or ammunition where 
they would cause secondary explosions.14 the saboteurs went about 
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their  normal business in Manila carrying the small bombs with them. 
When they got to a target they would place their bomb and activate it. 
the bombs were supposed to go off around midnight that night but as 
ramsey and the others waited and watched the city the bombs did not go 
off. two hours later, they were about to lose hope when explosions ripped 
through the city. the Japanese’s main fuel depot was exploding and 
then the tanker cars at the rail station exploded. oil lubricant tanks also 
exploded and the explosions continued throughout the night. near dawn 
there was a massive explosion on the bay. one bomb had been placed 
into a 50 gallon oil drum and that drum had been loaded onto a 10,000 
ton Japanese tanker. the entire Japanese tanker exploded causing a 
nearby tanker and cruiser to go up in flames.15 in response to this attack 
the Japanese constructed roadblocks all across Manila, confiscated food 
from the citizens, many of whom had already been starving, and  doubled 
their patrols. none of these efforts were effective because nobody 
 betrayed the location of ramsey’s base.16
ramsey sent messages to general Macarthur every day via radio 
 describing what the Japanese were doing. as Macarthur’s invasion of 
the Philippines drew near, the messages sent out from ramsey’s base 
increased significantly. reports poured in from ramsey’s scouts which 
detailed the Japanese defenses.17 When Macarthur’s invasion force 
landed at leyte gulf on october 20, 1944, ramsey’s guerillas worked 
even harder. they ambushed Japanese patrols and convoys. one ambush 
was especially fruitful when they found the new plans for the Japanese 
defense of the island on one of the officers they had killed. the details of 
the plan were radioed to general Macarthur.18 When the american forces 
pushed forward, the Japanese became trapped between the americans 
and the filipino guerillas. the intelligence and support provided by the 
guerillas saved many american lives and shortened the amount of time  
it took to retake the Philippines.
this case study provides a few lessons in combating insurgents. none of 
the efforts by the Japanese were effective in combating the  insurgency. 
the roadblocks did not restrict their movement since they could 
 easily evade them. the patrols were also ineffective in restricting the 
 insurgent’s movement or catching large numbers of them because of 
their use of scouts to track the Japanese patrols. the patrols were also 
easy targets for ambush by insurgents. the cutting off of food supplies 
to  civilians did not weaken the civilian support for the insurgency and 
 nobody betrayed the location of ramsey’s base to the Japanese. the 
brutal treatment of prisoners was also ineffective in gaining any useful 
information about the insurgents. the insurgency continued to grow 
despite the efforts of the Japanese.
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it is also important to note how the insurgents could inflict significant 
damage on the Japanese with small and simple explosives. What was 
 essentially a pipe bomb was able to sink two Japanese tankers and 
 cripple one cruiser simply because it was placed in a good location. the 
rest of the pipe bombs destroyed significant amounts of Japanese oil 
which could not be easily replaced.
Soviet–Afghan War and Aftermath: 1979–September 
2001
in December 1979, the Soviet union invaded afghanistan in order to prop 
up the floundering afghan communist regime. in response, the united 
States significantly increased their funding of the anti-communist afghan 
Mujahideen. Much of this funding went through the Pakistani iSi who 
 distributed it to their favored commanders such as gulbuddin  Hekmatyar.19 
the cia also dealt directly with other effective  commanders who were 
 being undermined by the iSi such as ahmed Shah  Massoud.20 However, 
this direct aid was not enough to influence post-Soviet  afghanistan.
in 1986, the united States began shipping Stinger missiles to the 
 Mujahideen. these missiles were so effective against the Soviets that 
they were no longer able to carry out low-flying attack raids or  evacuate 
their wounded by helicopter. this turned the tide of the war against the 
 Soviets.21 gorbachev began wondering what the Soviets were doing 
there and planned to withdraw within a year or two. the Soviets were 
completely surprised by the presence of this advanced weapon on the 
battlefield. Without any warning, the Soviets were unable to prepare 
any defenses against it. in 1989, the Soviets left afghanistan leaving the 
 communist najibullah government to fend for itself.
in 1992, Massoud’s forces captured Kabul. When they occupied the city, 
there were no retributions and their primary goal, according to Massoud, 
was to protect the afghan people in the city. an interim government was 
formed with Burrudin rabbani being declared the president and Mas-
soud being named the minister of defense.22 However, Pakistan did not 
favor this government and supported Hekmatyar in his fight against the 
interim government. By mid-1992, the two sides began  fighting on the 
streets of Kabul.23 in 1994, Hekmatyar was defeated and the Pakistanis 
shifted their support to the taliban, a new group formed in the madrassas 
of the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the northwest frontier.24
the taliban moved out of Pakistan and into afghanistan in 1994. they 
wielded brand new weapons and promised to bring an end to the  violence 
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plaguing afghanistan. Many afghans initially  welcomed the  taliban 
because they believed their pledge to stop the violence. the  taliban 
were able to buy many of their victories and many  afghans joined their 
side. When they got to Kabul in 1996, the  interim  government withdrew 
 because they did not wish for the city to be  damaged any further. they 
withdrew to Bagram air Base to the north of Kabul.25 they held the line 
here until u.S. military aid and  bombing allowed the northern  alliance 
to drive the taliban out of Kabul in  november 200126 even though 
 President Bush did not want the  northern alliance to be the ones to take 
the city.27
this case study provides some important lessons in the type of strategic 
intelligence that should be collected in order to ensure that the  situation 
does not destabilize in the long term. During the Soviet–afghan War 
the united States was supporting the insurgency, but this lesson can be 
applied when combating an insurgency as well. the united States either 
failed to consider or failed to fully realize Pakistan’s intentions in regards 
to afghanistan. Pakistan wanted afghanistan to be a  fundamentalist 
islamic state that they could influence. they also wanted more  radical 
fighters to use in their fight over Kashmir. the united States should 
have collected more intelligence on Pakistan’s intentions instead of 
 allowing them to dictate who the funding and weapons went to for most 
of the war. When fighting an insurgency, it is important to  monitor the 
 neighboring countries very closely because support in the form of 
 weapons, supplies, or more volunteers could flow from neighboring 
countries and insurgents could hide in neighboring countries.
the united States also failed to pay attention to those who saw the need 
to aid the afghan interim government following the fall of najibullah’s 
government. the intelligence was there and the radicals clearly had an 
advantage, having received most of the aid that the united States and 
Saudi arabia had funneled through Pakistan, but the warnings that 
these radicals would be a threat were ignored. When fighting against an 
 insurgency, the decision to pull out of that fight should be taken with 
great care and that decision should rely on intelligence reports. 
 intelligence should be collected on the country where the insurgency  
is taking place and on the insurgent group or groups. the reports 
should include how much support the government has and how much 
support the  insurgency has, the military and police capabilities of the 
 government, the ease with which the insurgency can inflict damage, and 
an analysis of whether or not the government will be able to withstand 
the insurgency. if the report finds that the insurgency will be able to 
 overpower the government, then the supporting country should continue 
its support of the government against the insurgency.
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U.S. Involvement in Lebanese Civil War: 1982–1984
the u.S. Marines came to lebanon as peacekeepers in august 1982.  
they went there to facilitate the withdrawal of the Plo forces from 
 lebanon but america did not understand the deep history of lebanon or 
the roots of their conflict which was full of passion on every side. During 
the first few months the Marines were there, the fighting did die down 
but soon the lebanese grew tired of the lectures from the  americans 
and returned to their fighting.28 the Marines had originally only been 
 scheduled to be there for one month but they withdrew two weeks earlier 
than the  deadline because all of the Plo fighters had departed and they 
did not want an open-ended mission. after they left, israel invaded 
West Beirut and the massacres of the Palestinians at Sabra and Shatila 
 occurred. So, the americans returned out of guilt.29
the american’s thought that lebanon already had the right political 
institutions and that those institutions were merely too weak in their 
current state so they decided to try and rebuild the central government 
and the army.30 unfortunately they were unaware of lebanese President, 
amin gemayel’s intentions. He used the americans against his Muslim 
enemies. By training the lebanese national army, the americans came 
to be seen by the Muslims as being on gemayel’s side of the conflict 
rather than as being peacekeepers. it started with rocks being thrown at 
 Marines who were on foot patrols, then a grenade injured five Marines, 
and then the u.S. embassy was struck by a suicide car bomber on april 
18, 1983. finally, on the morning of September 19, the americans  
ceased to be peacekeepers and became just another faction in the civil 
war. the commander of the lebanese army, general tannous claimed 
that  Syrian- and Palestinian-backed Druze units were launching a  
major offensive against his army at Souk el-gharb and they would not  
be able to hold out. if Souk el-gharb was taken, the Druze would be able 
to fire down onto the presidential palace. Without seeking  confirmation 
of  general  tannous’ report, the guided missile cruisers Virginia, John 
Rodgers, and Bowen and the destroyer Radford fired 360 5-inch shells at 
the Syrian, Palestinian, and Druze attackers. the next day the americans 
discovered that only eight lebanese army soldiers had been killed the day 
before. on the morning of october 23, 1983 the Marines’  headquarters 
was struck by a suicide car bomber and 241 american  servicemen were 
killed. on february 26, 1984 the Marines finished  pulling out of 
 lebanon. their 18 month stay in lebanon had  accomplished  nothing 
because the policy makers did not have the proper intelligence to 
 sunderstand the conflict they were sending the Marines into.
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Assessment of Intelligence Operations and Tactics
Effective Ineffective/Not Done
American  
Revolution
give British  
false  intelligence  
concerning troops  
movements and  
troop strength
British didn’t seek 
to corroborate their 
 intelligence through 
multiple sources
First Boer  
War
Boers exploit terrain  
to their advantage
British did not  
scout terrain— 
assumed it was  
and  unassailable  
position
Second Boer  
War
Boers built  
fake  defenses  
where the British  
thought their  
defenses would be  
and hidden defenses  
in other places
British removed  
Boers base of  
support by  burning  
crops and  putting  
civilians in camps
British watched  
Boer  movements  
with blockhouse  
chains
Filipino  
Insurgency
intelligence gathered  
by filipinos using  
cell  structure
Japanese patrols
Japanese raids
Japanese torture
Japanese roadblocks
filipinos used runners  
for communications.  
only one radio at the  
camp which was used  
to  communicate  
with Macarthur.
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Effective Ineffective/Not Done
filipino scouts tracked  
Japanese patrols
Japanese eventually  
did triangulate on  
radio position 
Soviet–Afghan War 
and  aftermath
Stinger missiles  
devastated Soviet  
aircraft
Soviets failed  
to  foresee  
introduction  
of  advanced  
american weapons  
like the Stinger
taliban propaganda americans failed to see 
the strengthening  
of the radical  
islamists
americans did not  
look into  Pakistan’s 
 intentions  concerning 
 afghanistan
Lebanese Civil War americans failed 
to  realize israel’s 
 intentions
americans failed to 
 understand the  
culture and history  
of the  conflict
americans failed  
to see how the 
 government was  
not representative  
of the citizens and  
was merely another 
 faction
americans used 
 overwhelming naval 
 firepower without 
 checking their own 
 intelligence
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Lessons Learned
in each conflict there were effective and ineffective intelligence 
 operations and tactics performed. in some cases only one side did 
 anything effective. in other cases both sides were effective in different 
ways. the following charts categorize each operation as being either 
 effective or ineffective/not done.
there are two effective non-intelligence operations that should be 
 highlighted as well. these are the pipe bombs used during the  filipino 
insurgency and the suicide car bombs used during the lebanese civil 
War. once the pipe bombs were planted, there was little that the 
 Japanese would have been able to do even if they had learned of the  
operation. the targets were chosen by each individual and although a  
few individuals were caught, the bombs still inflicted a massive  
amount of damage. the one that did the most damage was dropped  
into a barrel of oil so it was impossible to see after it was planted.  
During the suicide truck bombings in lebanon, the only warning  
was the truck speeding toward each building. these operations are 
 similar to the planting of  improvised explosive devices by insurgents in 
iraq and afghanistan. once an ieD is planted it is difficult to detect and 
while some can be jammed, insurgents will just revert back to lower-tech 
detonators that cannot be jammed such as hardwired detonators.  
the safer and more effective way to counter the threat of ieDs is to  
learn of the operations beforehand and learn where they are  being 
kept. each bomb has a bomb maker. lieutenant ramsey and the 
 filipinos relied upon one man, the technical director of the Manila gas 
company, to make the pipe bombs. Modern insurgents rely on many 
bomb makers and also ship in bombs from neighboring  countries. 
 Discovering intelligence on both of these types of operations and 
 stopping them is critical.
false intelligence can be used by insurgents to turn people against the 
counter-insurgents and prevent their supply lines from being disrupted, 
their weapons caches from being discovered, or their cells from being 
discovered. a counterinsurgent force should not fall into the same trap 
that the British did during the american revolution. that is why the first 
lesson is to gather intelligence from multiple sources.
During the Boer Wars the terrain was hilly and the Boers were able to use 
this to their advantage on many occasions. in iraq, much of the combat 
occurs in cities. the insurgents know this terrain well. they have lived 
there and can blend into the civilian population. Where the Boers used 
trees and bushes for cover, the insurgents in iraq use the fact that they 
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are inconspicuous. it is important for a counterinsurgent force to know 
the terrain and each part of the terrain that can be exploited. in these 
urban environments the civilians are in a way part of the terrain. troops 
assigned to an area should get to know as many of the civilians there as 
they can. getting to know the people provides counterinsurgents with 
multiple benefits. the troops can build trust and understanding with the 
people, the people may provide them with actionable intelligence, it 
lessens the pool of possible recruits for insurgents, and it removes those 
people as cover for the insurgents.
the British built chains of blockhouses so that they could contain the 
Boers. this was effective because the Boers had previously been able to 
slip by the large British garrisons and strike wherever they wanted. the 
blockhouse could be adapted to work in the mountains and fields  
of afghanistan as well as the cities of iraq. By creating a series of 
 armored, unmanned observation posts along the border with  Pakistan 
where the insurgents infiltrate, u.S. forces would gain real time 
 intelligence on their movements. With this intelligence, u.S. forces  
could either move in to intercept them or call in air strikes on their 
 positions. in an urban  environment, the idea could be adapted by creating 
a series of small outposts throughout the city rather than  concentrating 
forces in the large bases. Small scattered outposts would allow soldiers 
to protect larger areas of the cities from insurgent attacks and respond 
quicker when  insurgents do attack. these bases would be close enough 
together that they could support each other if they came under attack.
the British also denied Boer civilians of their food supplies and placed 
them into camps. these were effective tactics against the Boers but 
they would not be effective against the modern insurgent. the case of 
the filipino insurgency illustrated why. the Japanese had used  similar 
 techniques against the filipinos and none of them were  effective. 
 instead, filipino resolve only strengthened in each instance. the 
 modern  insurgent is more like the filipino than they are like the Boer. 
 tactics like torture, rounding up civilians suspected of being  insurgents, 
and cutting off food supplies would only strengthen the resolve of the 
 modern  insurgent and provide more reasons for more people to join 
the  insurgents.  insurgents use propaganda to recruit people and each 
of these tactics feed the  insurgent’s propaganda machine. the taliban 
used  propaganda  during their rise to power and many afghans got 
behind them because they wanted an end to the fighting. the taliban’s 
 propaganda is all lies but they are still able to attract people to their 
cause with it. the  counterinsurgencies in iraq and afghanistan are 
noble  missions. u.S. soldiers are there to protect the popularly elected 
 government and their citizens. the insurgents lure people in with 
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lies about u.S. intentions. it is important to learn the sources of the 
 propaganda and counter the propaganda with both words and actions.
it is also important to keep a close eye on the neighbors of countries that 
are battling insurgencies. often these countries have their own plans 
for their neighbors. Weapons and volunteers have been known to cross 
over from bordering countries. that this happens does not  necessarily 
mean that it is happening with the consent of that country. if it is not, 
then that neighboring country should be pressed to take action against 
those  helping the insurgency. additionally, the borders should be 
tightly  guarded to curtail, and hopefully stop, the flow of weapons and 
 volunteers from neighboring countries.
When fighting an insurgency it is important to understand their 
 culture and why the conflict exists in the first place. Without  collecting 
 intelligence on these two areas, mistakes, such as the mistakes that the 
united States made in lebanon, could be made. a conflict has to be 
understood before it can be diffused and a culture has to be understood 
because the culture provides the backdrop for every aspect of their 
life. the united States tried to interpret lebanon in terms of american 
 culture. this misinterpretation caused many of the problems that drove 
the Muslim factions in lebanon against the united States.
Some of these tactics are being used today to combat insurgents in 
iraq and afghanistan but each one of these tactics is like a piece of a 
puzzle. By not using every piece, the puzzle cannot be completed and 
the  counterinsurgency cannot progress. a counterinsurgency is a long, 
 difficult process. an insurgency cannot be defeated through brute force. 
it requires the precision that only good intelligence can deliver.
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